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I. BACKGROUND
“[Public] libraries should be open to all–except the censor.”1
-John F. Kennedy
A. The Internet: The New Public Library
The internet is the center of global communication, culture,
and education. As of January 2019, Western Europe is second
only to North America and Northern Europe in internet
penetration (a statistic that measures the availability of internet
in a given geographical place), with data reporting that 94
percent of Western Europeans have access to the internet.2 The
same study reported that 50 percent of the global population
now has internet access, which is a staggering 49.5 percent
increase from the recorded estimate in 1990 of just half a
percent.3 From the development of the first computer, to the role
of Facebook in the Arab Spring,4 and now the mass global social
media culture, human beings are moving ever more towards life
on the web. For those who use it daily, the internet has become
the epitome of global civilization.
The internet has become the new idea marketplace, in
which the exchange of ideas, knowledge, values, and cultures
freely move from source to source. As such, the internet can be
a foundation upon which revolutions and world events emanate
out of, such as the Arab Spring of 2010. However, inherent in
1 John F. Kennedy, The Candidates and the Arts, SATURDAY REV., Oct. 29,
1960, at 44.
2 J. Clement, Global internet penetration rate as of January 2019, by
region,
STATISTA
(Sept.
6,
2019),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/269329/penetration-rate-of-the-internetby-region/.
3 Max Roser, Hannah Ritchie & Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Internet, OUR
WORLD DATA (2019), https://ourworldindata.org/internet.
4 See John Liolos, Erecting New Constitutional Cultures: The Problems
and Promise of Constitutionalism Post-Arab Spring, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 219, 221 (2013) (stating that Arab Spring was “organic movements
comprised of frustrated citizens demonstrating against their tyrannical
governments for freedom, greater representation, and economic opportunity.”);
see generally Jared Malsin & Hassan Morajea, Unrest Rises Again in
Birthplace of Arab Spring, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2018, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/unrest-returns-to-tunisia-birthplace-of-the-arabspring-1516789801 (explaining the origins of the Arab Spring as a movement
for freedom and liberty in the Middle East).
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this ever-evolving worldwide information source is the risk and
danger of personal data falling into the hands of criminals,
and/or the constant threat of private information remaining on
the internet forever.5 This issue is not relegated to hackers or
criminals, as large companies like Google and Facebook have
fallen under fire for their misuse and failure to protect an
individual’s data.6 Yet, data breaches and misuse are not the
only dangers associated with the internet. Unwanted personal
data can remain on the internet when it is no longer desired,
creating a “permanent stigmatization”7 of one’s reputation. This
stigmatization can impact employment hopes and create
negative impacts in social circles. A combination of these three
threats has created the problem of data privacy and the modern
remedy of the right to be forgotten.8
B. Solutions for Data Protection
The roots of data privacy and protection reform in the
European Union (hereinafter “EU”) can be traced to the
enactment of Directive 95/46/EC in 1995 (hereinafter
“Directive”),9 and its successor, the General Data Protection
Regulation (hereinafter “GDPR”) in 2016.10 The Directive
stipulated that personal data, i.e. all the information related to

5 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data
Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L. J. 115, 115–17 (2017) (noting that there are inherent
dangers in the exchange of data across the world, particularly in the
transatlantic trade forum).
6 See Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes
Accounts of 50 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018) (stating that “hackers
also tried to harvest people’s private information, including name, sex and
hometown, from Facebook’s systems”).
7 Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to
Be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 349,
353 (2015).
8 Id.
9 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 25, 1995 O.J.
(L 281) 31 [hereinafter The Directive].
10
Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J.
(L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
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a person that can be used to directly or indirectly identify them,11
should only be
“collected [only] for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and
not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes”;
that the processing of data be “adequate, relevant and not
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected”;
that personal data be maintained accurately and “kept up to date”;
and that personal data be “kept in a form which permits
identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for
the purposes for which the data were collected.”12

Included in the Directive was the empowerment of
individuals to remove or block data which violated the
prescribed methods of data storage or usage.13 The ability to
block or remove data later became known as the right to be
delisted or dereferenced—commonly referred to as the “right to
be forgotten.”14
However, the year 1995 was hardly the beginning for the
right to be forgotten. Data protection was recognized as a means
of the larger right to privacy, as well as “dignity, personality, and
self-determination.”15 The foundations of data protection rights
date back to World War II, when the evils of fascism and the
ideology of Adolf Hitler impressed upon Europe the need to
recognize the dignity of human beings and the enumeration of
liberties.16 This movement created a more established post-war
identity for Europe in the global arena and led to the enactment
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter “Charter”)
and the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter
“Convention”).17 It is important to note however, that the
See id. art. 4.
See Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain,
the Right to be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE
L.J. 981, 984–85 (2018) (discussing and citing to The Directive).
13 Id. at 985.
14
See generally The Directive, supra note 9 (describing the general
dereferencing provisions of the right to be forgotten).
15 Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 5, at 123.
16 See id. (discussing the origin of Europe’s interest in data protection).
17
See id. at 124 (noting the roots of the enactment of the European
Convention of Human Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights).
11
12
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Charter is interpreted by the EU and by the European Court of
Justice—the highest court in the EU—while the Convention is
recognized as international law, and is interpreted by the
European Court of Human Rights.18 Thus, the Convention is
binding only as a body of international law, meaning that it
interprets the Convention to the extent that it coincides with
“general principles of the Union’s law.”19 There is no need to fret
under this scheme of statutory interpretation in light of data
protection; however, as the right to privacy is a fundamental
right and “general principles of the Union’s Law;” but the
presence of two major bodies of law and their respective courts
of interpretation evidences the great protection that human
rights and data protection own.20
From the mid-1990s thereon, data protection remained a
mainstay of the protections afforded to EU citizens. The right to
be forgotten, as a remedy for data protection failures, stemmed
from a recognized ability that every person in everyday
conversations has: to have their actions forgotten or discarded;
a new start.21 It is worth noting that there is an inherent risk
involved when conveying information to a third-party—speaking
out loud in public, for example—because other third parties will
share and remember that information. However, human beings
possess a capability that does not exist on the internet—the
ability, rather than surety, to forget information. The ability to
forget information allows for an opportunity for a fresh start.22
Such is the cognitive capability of human beings to forget,
which “is useful because it enables humans to adjust and
reconstruct memories, to generalize, and to construct abstract
thoughts.”23 The ability to forget enables individuals to achieve
a fresh start independent from their past actions, which can act
as a vehicle to maintain dignity and privacy. With the
Id. at 124–25.
Id. at 125 (citing Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/13, art. 6).
20 Id.
21
See Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 352 (discussing humans’
critical ability to forget).
22 See id. (discussing selective memory as a way to enable us to shed the
past and start fresh).
23 Id.
18
19
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introduction and explosion of the internet and social media, this
ability has been effectively lost in the flow of history, allowing
people to recall matters and events that might not have been
remembered pre-internet.24 In effect, the internet has become a
“cruel historian,” allowing individuals’ personal information to
be exposed and shared throughout the world in a matter of
seconds.25 In this view, the internet and social media dampen
individual freedoms and makes individuals bound to their
personal data that finds its way on the internet.26 This argument
is a major justification for the existence of a broader right to be
forgotten.
The right to be forgotten faced its first major threat in 2014
on the precipice of the enactment of the GDPR when a Spanish
man sought to have his insolvency removed from Google’s search
listings in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (hereinafter
“Google Spain”).27 By ruling in favor of Mario Casteja González,
the European Court of Justice solidified the right to be forgotten
and propelled the right to an international stage because Google
could be required to delist or remove information and data from
their web databases.28 Two years later, in 2016, the EU enacted
the GDPR, which incorporated a more established right to be
forgotten and applied those rights to member states. The GDPR
allows a number of specific actions to EU citizens whereby:
[p]rivate persons will have the right to delete links to their own
postings and repostings by third parties. They will have a right to
delete links to postings created by third parties upon proof that
the information serves no legitimate purpose other than to
24 See id. (“[T]he Internet is a treasure trove of immutable memories and
data subjects [which one] must take extraordinary steps in order to forget.”).
25
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 11 (2007).
26 See id. at 17 (arguing that the Internet makes us “less free,” forcing
people to be victims to data on the internet); see generally Chris Conley, The
Right To Delete, 2010 AAAI SPRING SYMPOSIUM: INTELLIGENT INFORMATION
PRIVACY
MANAGEMENT,
Mar.
23,
2010,
at
53
https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/SSS/SSS10/paper/view/1158/1482 (finding
that individuals can be bound by their actions that were taken on the internet).
27 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014).
28 Id.; Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 353–54, 374.
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embarrass or extort payment from the data subject. Public officials
and public figures will have a right to remove links to their own
postings and repostings by third parties, but not postings about
them by third parties, unless the third party was acting with
actual malice and the posting does not implicate the public’s right
to know. In addition, all right to be forgotten requests will be
subject to a general exemption for the public’s right to know. 29

The GDPR ensures that individuals have the ability to
remove their data from the internet, in order to facilitate the
rights of individual dignity and privacy.30
C. Danger of Extraterritorial Expansion
In 2016, the right to be forgotten encountered the possibility
of global expansion in Google Inc. v. Commission nationale de
l’informatique et des libertés (hereinafter “Google v. CNIL”),
where there was a challenge of fines instituted against Google
for the failure to remove personal data existing outside of the EU
by the French data protection authority, known as the
Commission Nationale de L’informatique et des Libertés
(hereinafter “CNIL”).31 The CNIL “requested that Google delist
search results subject to a successful request for erasure from all
domains worldwide” and asserted that the EU’s right to be
forgotten can only be enforced by requiring a data controller like
Google to remove data beyond the EU’s geographical and
jurisdictional limits.32
CNIL further argued that “the
information can still be accessed through other domains or by
using circumvention methods such as a virtual private network

Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 354.
See id. at 354, 359 (showing that in Europe there is a right to privacy
and that the GDPR can be utilized to help promote privacy).
31
See Case C-507/17, Google Inc. v. Commission nationale de
l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 2017 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS
62017CN0507 (Aug. 21, 2017) (requesting that the precedent of the “right to
de-referencing” be expanded “so that the links at issue no longer appear,
irrespective of the place from where the search initiated on the basis of the
requester’s name is conducted, and even if it is conducted from a place outside
the territorial scope of Directive [95/46/EC] of 24 October 1995[.]”).
32
Michèle Finck, Google v CNIL: Defining the Territorial Scope of
European Data Protection Law, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/11/google-v-cnildefining-territorial-scope-european-data-protection-law.
29
30
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(VPN).”33 Google maintained that such an expansion would
unjustly swell the jurisdiction of the EU, importing power it
lacks on subjects around the world, some of which would
inevitably derive from nations which valued free expression and
privacy variably.34
The action was brought before the Conseil d’Etat, or the
Council of State, France, whom in turn stayed the proceedings
and referred several questions of interpretation to the CJEU.35
The main question presented was “whether the rules of EU law
relating to the protection of personal data are to be interpreted
as meaning that, where a search engine operator grants a
request for de-referencing, that operator is required to carry out
that de-referencing on all versions of its search engine.”36 The
argument on this issue was heard before the CJEU in the
summer of 2018.37
The expansion of the right to be forgotten raised concerns
regarding free expression globally; including that inherent
within dereferencing is the “cannibaliz[ation of] free
expression[;]” as free thought, free expression, and free speech
can all be restricted by the removal of information from the
marketplace.38 It was also widely recognized that the right to be
forgotten enabled the EU to limit the effectuation of these
freedoms in exchange for another, the right of privacy, and in
turn, censor free expression and freedom of the press.39 What’s
more, was the possibility that the right to be forgotten could
have been enforced against those not ordinarily subject to the
EU’s authority. Such enforcement would impose EU ideals in an
ideological imperialism campaign; resulting in a major impact
Id.
Id.
35 Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No. 112/19, The
Operator of a Search Engine is not Required to Carry out a De-Referencing on
all Versions of its Search Engine, (Sept. 24, 2019).
36 Id.
37 Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique
et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62017CJ0507 (Sept. 24,
2019).
38 See Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 354 (discussing removal of
information and its effects on the freedom of speech, expression, and thought).
39 Id.
33
34
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on global free expression and speech.
The Advocate General of the EU issued a preliminary
opinion on January 10, 2019, stating that the right to be
forgotten can only be enforced within the EU via “geoblocking.”40 The Advocate General stated:
[T]here is a danger that the Union will prevent people in third
countries from accessing information. If an authority within the
Union could order a global deference, a fatal signal would be sent
to third countries, which could also order a dereferencing under
their own laws . . . . There is a real risk of reducing freedom of
expression to the lowest common denominator across Europe and
the world.41

The preliminary opinion further stated that the GDPR
cannot apply to nations outside of the EU, because asserting the
EU law over other nations poses a risk of ranking one the right
to privacy as more important than the right to free expression;
instead, the opinion stated a geo-blocking system should be put
in place which limits removal of data only in the EU, and not in
other countries.42 It is important to note that the CJEU was not
required to follow this preliminary opinion because under EU
law, the opinions issued by the Advocate General are not binding
on the court.43
The CJEU rendered its decision thereafter on September 24,
2019, holding that the GDPR does not explicitly require data
40
Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No. 2/19,
Advocate General Szpunar proposes that the Court should limit the scope of
the de-referencing that search engine operators are required to carry out to the
EU (Jan. 10, 2019).
41 Monckton Chambers, Google v CNIL: Advocate General agrees global
“right to be forgotten” orders pose risk to freedom of expression, MONCKTON
CHAMBERS (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.monckton.com/google-v-cnil-advocategeneral-agrees-global-right-to-be-forgotten-orders-pose-risk-to-freedom-ofexpression/.
42 See generally Case C-507/17, Google Inc. v. Commission nationale de
l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
62017CV0507 (Jan. 10, 2019) (discussing the issues of privacy and the concept
of geo-blocking).
43 See Press Release No. 2/19, supra note 40 n.[1] (“It is the role of the
Advocates General to propose to the Court, in complete independence, a legal
solution to the cases for which they are responsible.”).
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controllers to execute a dereferencing request on platforms
without the territorial jurisdiction of the EU.44 In its reasoning,
the court opined that “the right to the protection of personal data
is not an absolute right,” and as such, the right to be forgotten
must be balanced with other fundamental freedoms, such as free
expression.45 If the right to be forgotten was promulgated
outside the EU by requiring companies like Google to comport
with the GDPR in other jurisdictions, then the court held that
the EU would be infringing on the differing views of other
nations’ balancing of free expression and privacy.46 Further
support for this opinion was rooted in provisions within Article
85 of the GDPR and Article nine of the earlier Directive, which
permits members states of the EU to enact exemptions from the
right to be forgotten “for journalistic purposes or for the purpose
of artistic or literary expression[, but] only if they are necessary
to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom
of expression.”47 Given that both the GDPR and the Directive
delegated such responsibilities to the member states, there is an
implicit awareness noted in the GDPR regarding the possibility
that member states value free expression differently, and
nonetheless other sovereign nations because of their entirely
different governmental structures and customs.48
Regardless of how victorious this case initially appeared for
data controllers and search engine operators, the court left open
the possibility that the right to be forgotten could still be
enforced globally.49 The court held that while the application of
the right to be forgotten is not required to be enforced without
the jurisdictional confines of the EU, such an application
remains permissive if after both the privacy interests of the data
subject and free expression are given proper consideration, the
44 Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique
et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62017CJ0507 (Sept. 24,
2019).
45 Id. ¶ 60.
46 Id.
47 Id. ¶ 7 (quoting The Directive, supra note 9 art. 9).
48 See id. ¶ 27 (quoting GDPR, supra note 10 art. 85).
49 See id. ¶ 73 (stating that a search engine operator granting request to
de-referencing “is not required to carry out that de-referencing on all versions
of its search engine, but on the versions of that search engine corresponding to
all the Member States”).
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interest of privacy is best served.50 Therefore, what was thought
to be defined in Google v. CNIL, the territorial confines of the
right to be forgotten, remains unanswered and the
implementation of such right can still occur throughout the
world, leaving the legal basis for doing so unexplained.51
In light of the instability provided by the CJEU’s decision in
Google v. CNIL, this article will provide further insight into the
relationship between the right to be forgotten and free
expression that can continue to exist when applied globally.
Moreover, this article pursues an exposition on the negative
implications that a right to be forgotten may proffer on global
freedom of expression.
II. RESTRICTING FREEDOM BY FORGETTING
A. Google Spain v. AEPD: The Prevailing Rule
The main motivation behind the drafting and eventual
enactment of the Directive was to protect individual human
rights through the enactment of privacy laws which limited the
scope and use of private information.52 Such motivation
stemmed from the post-war period of European history and led
to the enactment of the first privacy statute in Germany on
September 30, 1970.53 This led to the enactment of privacy
statutes in Sweden in 1973, and Austria, Denmark, and Norway
in 1978.54 There was widespread consensus that the policies
made during this period would be centered around “Fair
Information Practices” in the global exchange of information,
Adam Satariano, ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Privacy Rule Is Limited by
Europe’s
Top
Court,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
24,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/technology/europe-google-right-to-beforgotten.html.
51
Dan Shefet, Extraterritoriality, the internet and the right to be
forgotten,
ABA
J.
(Oct.
10,
2019,
9:52
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/voice/article/extraterritoriality-and-the-internet
(noting that the EUCJ “did not follow the advocate general’s Jan. 10, 2019,
recommendation entirely” and in doing so “the court wished to promulgate that
as a general principle extraterritoriality was not unlawful.”).
52
Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to
Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1971–72 (2013).
53 Id. at 1969.
54 Id.
50
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agreed upon by Western Europe and the United States
(hereinafter “U.S.”).55 Two additional privacy policies also went
into effect during this period: the “Privacy Guidelines of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(hereinafter “OECD”) and the Convention on Privacy of the
Council of Europe.”56 The Convention on Privacy of the Council
of Europe was the first Europe-wide agreement which
established harmonious privacy policies and provided the
foundation for the Directive’s enactment in 1995.57
The Directive provided regulations and conditions for
companies attempting to store or use personal data, including
consent and a duty to protect such data.58 The Directive had two
main goals: “to facilitate the free flow of personal data within the
EU” and “to ensure an equally high level of protection within all
countries in the EU for ‘the fundamental rights and freedoms of
natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy.’”59 As
mentioned above, this Directive included the right to be
forgotten, or to have personal data delisted from those
companies or servicers storing personal data, which was viewed
as a proper means to effectuate data privacy.60 In addition to
this remedy, “data subjects,” which are those who have data
located online, also “have the right to obtain copies of
information collected and the right to correct or delete personal
data.”61 Companies or data controllers would then be held liable
for holding such data against the wishes of the “data subject,”
facing fines for non-compliance.62

In 2014, the right to be forgotten intersected with free
expression in Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (hereinafter “Google Spain v. AEPD”). Mario Costeja
González, a Spanish citizen, sought to remove newspaper
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1970.
Schwartz, supra note 52, at 1972.
Id.
Id.
Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 361.
Id.
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articles regarding the auction of his home following his financial
difficulties.63 González petitioned the newspaper publisher to
remove the articles and for Google to remove the search listings
for these articles, his reasoning was that the articles were an
invasion into his privacy because they harmed his reputation
and were no longer relevant.64 The newspaper refused to remove
the articles, stating that the Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs had required them to be published in the first place, and
Google refused to remove the links on the basis that search
listings are considered free expression, and should not be
removed.65 The AEPD relied on the Directive’s requirement of
“data controllers” to remove information that was “inadequate,
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive,”66 and ordered
Google to remove the search listings that led users to the articles
concerning González.67
Google then appealed the order and brought this case before
the National High Court of Spain, who in turn referred the
matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).68
The applicability of the Directive became a major dispute upon
appeal as Google tried to argue that as a search engine, they
merely provided data online, and as a result could not be
considered a “data controller.”69
The CJEU denied this
argument and ruled that Google was indexing data online which
provided data to its users, placing the company into the category
of “data controllers;” and as such, the Directive applied.70 In this
landmark ruling, the CJEU created precedent which establishes
a broad right to have information delisted, thereby requiring
positive government intervention to protect such right for
63 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014).
64 Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 363–64.
65 Id.
66 Catherine Baksi, Right to be forgotten ‘must go’, Lords committee says,
GAZETTE (July 30, 2014), http://directories.lawgazette.co.uk/law/right-to-beforgotten-must-go-lords-committee-says/5042439.article.
67 Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, GLOBAL.
FREEDOM
EXPRESSION
(Nov.
16,
2018),
https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/google-spain-sl-vagencia-espanola-de-proteccion-de-datos-aepd/.
68 Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 364.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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information that an individual shows to be “inadequate,
irrelevant, or no longer relevant, or excessive.”71 In effect, this
precedent restricts free expression by allowing individuals to
alter the availability of information on the Internet, which
censors the original creator and prevents the free flow of
information.72
The GDPR as enacted in 2018, further
strengthens this precedent by expanding its reach to all source
websites and data controllers, regardless of whether or not they
are located within the EU.73
The GDPR and the right to be forgotten therein was geared
to fulfill the following three concepts: “(1) the right to have
information deleted after a preset period; (2) the right to have a
clean slate; and (3) the right to be connected to current
information and delinked from outdated . . . .”74 The procedure
for exercising this right is as follows: the data subject may have
information removed that is no longer necessary in relation to
the purposes for which it was collected or otherwise processed,
where data subjects have withdrawn their consent for
processing or where they object to the processing of personal
data concerning them or where the processing of their personal
data otherwise does not comply with this Regulation.75
Under the GDPR, the data controller bears the burden in
these situations to consider and adjudicate the issue of the
existence of the above factors.76 This poses an inherent burden
on data controllers being that they must process and make a
determination on each request, which can detract from business
operations or even significantly harm a smaller business.77
Additionally, it is worth noting that the information need not be
Baksi, supra note 66.
Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 365.
73 GDPR, supra note 10, art. 17.
74
Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 367; see Bert-Jaap Koops,
Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows. A Critical Analysis of the “Right to
be Forgotten” in Big Data Practice, 8 SCRIPTED 229, 232–33 (2011) (noting that
the right to be forgotten can be conceptualized in the same three manners).
75 GDPR, supra note 10, art. 17.
76 Id.
77
See Baksi, supra note 66 (noting Google’s European sites already
dealing with over 70,000 data removal requests, and smaller companies’
unlikelihood of having the resources to process the removal requests).
71
72
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even prejudicial to the data subject; the data must only fall
within the threshold of “no longer relevant” or the two other
enumerated justifications.78
To address the free expression confliction that Google Spain
v. AEPD posed, the GDPR included statutory exemptions for:
(a) . . . exercising the right of freedom of expression in accordance
with Article 80; (b) for reasons of public interest in the area of
public health in accordance with Article 81; (c) for historical,
statistical and scientific research purposes in accordance with
Article 83; (d) for compliance with a legal obligation to retain the
personal data by Union or Member State law to which the
controller is subject; Member State laws shall meet an objective of
public interest, respect the essence of the right to the protection of
personal data and be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued.79

At first glance this may seem to rectify concerns posed by
critics; however, upon closer look, the articles referenced and
other EU law do not provide a “bright line standard,” which
leaves data controllers to subjectively determine what is and
what is not freedom of expression.80 In order to assist in
deciphering what constitutes “expression” pursuant to the above
exemptions as to adequately process a request to remove or
delist information from the internet, Google has formed an
advisory council which lacks any sort of transparency or public
exposure as to their methodology for approaching such
requests.81 This fact illustrates the larger issue within the
promulgation of the right to be forgotten; in allowing data
controllers to make a determination as to what constitutes “free
78 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014).
79 Id.
80
See Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 371–72 (noting that free
expression in the EU is a qualified right, that cedes to national security,
defamation, crime prevention, protection of health and morals, confidential
information and the impartiality of the judiciary).
81 Julia Powles & Enrique Chaparro, How Google determined our right to
be
forgotten,
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
18,
2015,
2:30
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/18/the-right-be-forgottengoogle-search.

15

330

PACE INT’L L. REV.

Vol. 32:2

expression” within a given request without any transparency,
free expression itself is thereby diluted and left without a clear
precedent to abide by.82 Data controllers and their advisory
councils are thereby left to make a subjective determination of
what constitutes free expression in that situation. To this point,
there have been numerous accounts of newspaper articles, news
reports, and other public documents that can be considered to be
the free expression of the author, which have been delisted
through this process.83
It is also said that free expression in the EU is weaker than
its American counterpart,84 which is protected against vague
and overbroad restrictions, while free expression in the EU is
not.85 There is great ambiguity in what free expression is and
what it is not in the EU. This ambiguity can lead to varying
results and an overall lack of protection for this fundamental
right. Thus, a large threat exists in the implementation of the
right to be forgotten given the broad authority it promulgates,
or in other words, the original intention of the Right, which was
to remove unwanted personal data, now extends to censorship.
As Robert G. Larson states, “[s]uch imprecision when delimiting
the bounds of permissible speech invites overzealous
censorship[—]by the data subject as well as by third parties and
Web sites that host user content[—]has long been known to have
a chilling effect on speech . . . .”86

82 See David Mitchell, The right to be forgotten will turn the internet into
a
work
of
fiction,
GUARDIAN
(July
5,
2014,
7:05
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/06/right-to-be-forgotteninternet-work-of-fiction-david-mitchell-eu-google (arguing that comments or
actions made on the internet are never forgotten).
83
See id. (listing examples of articles or documents that have been
delisted).
84 Robert G. Larson III, Forgetting the First Amendment: How ObscurityBased Privacy and a Right to be Forgotten are Incompatible with Free Speech,
18 COMM. L. & POL’Y 91, 107 (2013).
85 See Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S.
569, 574–75 (1987) (finding a resolution that restricts First Amendment
activities unconstitutional “because no conceivable governmental interest
would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech.”).
86 Larson III, supra note 84, at 108.
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B. Google v. CNIL: The Ironic Anticlimax
Google Spain v. AEPD gave birth to a paradox of privacy
and free expression, forcing corporations and other online
entities to remove information from the internet and the digital
public market.87 International corporations categorized as data
controllers, like Google, thereafter faced thousands if not
hundreds of thousands of requests to delist or remove
information.88 Given the massive quantity of these requests,
corporations became inundated with those asking to remove
information from their websites, and when these corporations
failed to remove the information, they faced great fines.89 Since
2014, Google has received over 3.3 million requests and has
granted approximately 45 percent of these requests, some of
which were located on websites and domains90 outside of the
EU’s territorial reach.91
Of the requests that Google satisfied, it did not remove all
information or listings located on domains in the U.S., or those
outside the EU.92 The French data protection agency, the
Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés or the
“CNIL,” believed that Google’s actions were in direct
contravention of the Directive and instituted significant fines.93
87
See Alan Travis & Charles Arthur, EU court backs ‘right to be
forgotten’: Google must amend results on request, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2014, 9:06
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/13/right-to-beforgotten-eu-court-google-search-results (discussing the European court
decision backing the “right to be forgotten”); Mitchell, supra note 82
(explaining the ruling in Google Spain v. AEPD).
88 James Doubek, Google Has Received 650,000 ‘Right to Be Forgotten’
Requests Since 2014, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 28, 2018, 5:44 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/28/589411543/googlereceived-650-000-right-to-be-forgotten-requests-since-2014.
89 See Finck, supra note 32 (discussing the effects of the holding in Google
LLC v. CNIL).
90 See P. Christensson, Domain Name Definition, TECHTERMS, (Sept. 14,
2012), https://techterms.com/definition/domain_name (explaining that a
domain is the unique name which identifies a website and can have a country
code associated with it to identify the location the domain is registered in).
91 Finck, supra note 32; Satariano, supra note 50.
92 Finck, supra note 32.
93 See Tony Romm, France fines Google nearly $57 million for first major
violation of new European privacy regime, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2019, 12:54
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/france-fines-googlenearly-57-million-for-first-major-violation-of-new-european-privacy-
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The CNIL brought suit against Google, believing that the only
way to give full effect to the right to be forgotten was to extend
its reach to domains found outside the EU.94 Google disagreed
and contended that to extend authority outside the EU would
unjustly expand the EU’s governmental powers, contravening
the local law of that sovereign.95
The case was referred to the CJEU, known as Google LLC
v. CNIL, and was thought of as the case to determine the
territorial scope of the right to be forgotten.96 Google’s position
aptly illustrates the dangers of a global expansion of the EU’s
privacy laws, which is that of an act of “data imperialism” and a
violation of free expression.97 Data imperialism is the theory
that by placing the implication of the EU’s data ethics in the
hands of corporations abroad, the EU seeks to impart its own
values on other countries in the world.98 Inherent in this right
to be forgotten legal scheme is the danger that other countries
do not share the same value of privacy that the EU has
enumerated, which presents a conflict for both the citizens and
government of that country.99 Professor Cedric Ryngaert—a
professor of public international law—has noted that such
conflict can then “strike a different balance between data
protection and other societal imperatives,” which casts doubt on

regime/2019/01/21/89e7ee08-1d8f-11e9-a7592b8541bbbe20_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.623fc9fa52cc (French
regulators fined Google for “violating Europe’s tough new data-privacy rules”);
see also Mark Scott, Google Fined by French Privacy Regulator, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/technology/google-finedby-french-privacy-regulator.html (Google “was fined $112,000 . . . by France’s
data protection watchdog for failing to comply with demands to extend a
European privacy ruling across its global domains”).
94
See Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de
l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
62017CJ0507 (Sept. 24, 2019) (focusing on the regulation to Member States).
95 Finck, supra note 32.
96
See Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de
l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
62017CJ0507 (Sept. 24, 2019); Finck, supra note 31.
97 Finck, supra note 32.
98 See Cedric Ryngaert, Symposium Issue on Extraterritoriality and EU
Data Protection, 5 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 221, 224 (2015) (discussing the
difference between territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction).
99 Id. at 223.
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relations with other countries and civil relationships.100 It is
difficult to imagine a situation for example, where an order by
the CNIL to remove information from the internet would
likewise be valid under applicable U.S. law. Public information
is well protected in the U.S. under the First Amendment and
free speech restrictions are constitutionally protected for
overbreadth, which may apply to an otherwise broad right to be
forgotten.101
In its September 24, 2019 decision, the CJEU held that
under the GDPR, the right to be forgotten is not required to be
enforced globally.102 It reasoned that no-where in the text of the
Article 17(1) of the GDPR is an explicit requirement that data
controllers be mandated to remove any information that is
subject to removal under the provisions therein, regardless of
location.103 The CJEU acknowledged that there was validity to
CNIL’s position that the only manner in which to completely
effectuate the legislative intent of providing for the ultimate
privacy of EU subjects is to remove information, wherever it may
exist.104 The court explicitly stated that although the statement
was true and would meet the goal of ensuring privacy in full, to
affirm this point would unjustly favor privacy and inure great
prejudice to objects of free expression, including free access to
information and freedom of the press.105 Therefore, the court
held that when considering a request to remove information,
member states are required to evaluate the free expression
considerations within the then current facts, but are not bound
by the GDPR to mandate that the data be removed globally.106
Paragraph 72 of the decision, however, further muddied the
Id. at 225.
See Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S.
569, 575 (finding a resolution that restricts First Amendment activities
unconstitutional “because no conceivable governmental interest would justify
such an absolute prohibition of speech.”).
102 See generally Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de
l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
62017CJ0507 (Sept. 24, 2019).
103 Id. ¶¶ 3, 65.
104 Id. ¶ 55.
105 Id. ¶ 60.
106 Id. ¶ 72.
100
101
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future of the extent of the right to be forgotten, which stated
“[l]astly, it should be emphasised that, while, as noted in
paragraph 64 above, EU law does not currently require that the
de-referencing granted concern all versions of the search engine
in question, it also does not prohibit such a practice.”107 The
court failed to offer a legal basis or pathway for the execution of
such practice and instead referred the implementation thereof
to the member states.108 Thus, territorial boundaries of the right
to be forgotten are far from defined.
C. Current Framework
As a precursor to data removal, the data subject must
establish that the information is private, and then it is the
obligation of the data controller to either remove the information
or refuse to do so.109 The CJEU held in Google Spain that an
individual would be able to request that search engines or those
who engage in the “processing of data”110 remove links with
personal information, pursuant to the Directive and now
current, GDPR. Generally, only those considered to be a data
controller within the meaning of Article 4 of the GDPR could be
mandated to remove requested information.111 Generally, a
controller is defined as a company which “determines the
purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”112
Google Spain added a crucial implication to the application
of the right to be forgotten in holding that search engine
operators (hereinafter “SEOs”) are controllers within the
meaning of Article 4 of the GDPR.113 It was previously
established that data controllers, those who possess and store
data, had differing responsibilities and duties under the GDPR
than data “processors,” who merely provide access to
Id.
Satariano, supra note 50.
109 Case C-507/17, (Sept. 24, 2019), ¶ 16.
110 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014).
111 Daphne Keller, The Right Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws
and the EU 2016 General Data Protection Regulation, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
287, 323 (2018).
112 GDPR, supra note 10, art. 4.
113 Case C-131/12, (May 13, 2014), ¶ 47.
107
108
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information and data; data “controllers” were subject to the
dereferencing obligations of the right to be forgotten, whereas
the data processors were not.114 In this respect, SEOs were
thought of as data processors, given that they merely provided
access to websites and databases via links.115 Google Spain held
otherwise for reasons stated hereinabove and mandated that
SEOs comply with the dereferencing obligations within the then
current Directive, as replaced by the GDPR.116
Data which is subject to the dereferencing protections of the
right to be forgotten includes that which is inaccurate,
inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive.117 Google Spain held that
if an individual asserts that information found online falls into
any of the above categories, such persons can request that their
information be removed, thus forcing the data controller to
remove such information or allowing the individual to bring a
lawsuit.118 If a lawsuit is brought alleging enforcement of the
GDPR, then the data provider has the burden to show that the
data subject’s information should not be removed.119 The court
will make its determination on a case by case basis.
This process also applies in other jurisdictions under the
CJEU holding that stated that “even if the physical server of a
company processing data is located outside Europe, EU rules
apply to search engine operators if they have a branch or a
subsidiary in a Member State”.120 In Google Spain, the CJEU
opined that given the global nature of search engines and data
providers, the only way to effectuate the EU’s interest in
protecting the fundamental human right to privacy is to hold
these entities accountable extrajudicially.121 The CJEU further
Keller, supra note 111, at 307.
Id. at 311.
116 Case C-131/12, (May 13, 2014), ¶ 6.
117 Id. at ¶ 92.
118 Id. at ¶ 94.
119 EUROPEAN COMM’N, Factsheet on the “Right to Be Forgotten” Ruling
(C-131/12)
1,
3
(2018),
https://www.inforights.im/media/1186/cl_eu_commission_factsheet_right_to_b
e-forgotten.pdf.
120 OFFICIAL (ISC) GUIDE TO THE CISSP CBK 220 (Adam Gordon 4th ed.
2015).
121 Case C-131/12, (May 13, 2014), ¶ 3.
114
115
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dictated that “[s]earch engines are controllers of personal data[,
and therefore,] Google can . . . not escape its responsibilities
before European law when handling personal data by saying it
is a search engine.”122 Under Google Spain, EU jurisdiction
extends to wherever a citizen of the EU has data he or she wants
to be removed or dereferenced.123 As noted herein, this
extraterritorial aspect of the right to be forgotten still exists
under Google LLC v. CNIL. The only clarification that Google
LLC v. CNIL provided was that the member states are required
to consider the effect on free expression around the world when
determining the application of the right to be forgotten.124 It is
also important to note that the CJEU left open the possibility
that the right to be forgotten could be applied globally without
delineating a specific legal basis for doing so.125 Therefore,
Google Spain remains binding precedent and its shockwaves
continue to permeate the promulgation of the right to be
forgotten onto other nations.
D. Global Outlook
Therefore, there remains two major issues that can cause a
loss of liberties on the part of citizens and countries around the
world, as the possibility remains that the right to be forgotten
can be applied on other nations. First, being that the right to be
forgotten creates a hindrance on the availability and free flow of
information across the world, freedom of expression can be
weakened.126 Such implementation can also censor news outlets
and limit free press,127 resulting in a global exhibition of Plato’s
allegory of the cave; a situation in which individuals are only as
informed to the extent of the information that they are exposed
to.128 Second, the territorial reach can negatively impact
EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 119.
Id.
124 See generally Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de
l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
62017CJ0507 (Sept. 24, 2019).
125 Shefet, supra note 51.
126 Keller, supra note 111, at 363.
127 Id. at 297–98.
128 See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Benjamin Jowett trans., Project
Gutenberg 2016) (380 B.C.) (stating the allegory of the cave describes a theory
in which individuals’ knowledge is limited only to what they see, which can be
influenced by the limiting of free access to information).
122
123
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interactions amongst nations and deprive individuals of
differing freedoms extended to them by their respective counties,
such as the U.S., a place in which the right to be forgotten would
be inconsistent with its constitution.129 If the right to be
forgotten is not sufficiently tailored to fit the needs of free
expression, movements like the Arab Spring and the free flow of
information will be significantly dampened.
III. IMPACTS OF A GLOBAL RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
A. Free Access to Information: The Arab Spring and Social
Media Hosts
A major unanswered question of interpretation is whether
social media platforms, also known as “hosts,” such as Facebook
and Twitter can be held to be data controllers. If so, they would
be subject to the right to be forgotten.130 Applying the definition
of data controllers as those entities that determine the purpose
and means of processing personal data, critics have reasoned
that hosts cannot be found to be data controllers because they
merely provide access to information that is very often published
by the author who themselves possess the right to post or remove
such data.131 If hosts are held to be data controllers, there is no
telling what their obligations may be under the right to be
forgotten.132 Hosts could be forced to remove a post entirely or
delist the post from its own search results on its website.133 With
regard to the possibility that hosts could be required to comport
with the right to be forgotten, there is a risk that a user’s free
expression could be severely hindered, thereby reducing the
availability and free access to information around the world.
As it currently exists, the GDPR provides an exception to
the right to be forgotten for freedom of expression and
information that would be publicly available.134 However, as
129 John W. Dowdell, An American Right to be Forgotten, 52 TULSA L. REV.
311, 322, 332 (2017).
130 Keller, supra note 111, at 334–49.
131 Id. at 322.
132 Id. at 325.
133 See id. at 326 (discussing the implications of the European Union’s
landmark decision in Google Spain).
134 GDPR, supra note 10, art. 17.
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noted above, this exception is seen as illusory by critics, as the
exception fails to provide a standard for interpretation to be used
by the companies processing requests under the GDPR.135 The
reasoning behind this position is that if one lacks the proper
parameters to form a decision, that decision is vulnerable to
mistakes, impreciseness, and integrity.136 Those who decide
what information becomes delisted or not also decide larger
questions of what is to be considered free expression.137 It is no
secret that social media posts constitute a great number of
requests involved in the right to be forgotten. Many young adults
seek to remove embarrassing personal content from Facebook
which left online would be damaging to their reputation.138 On
one hand, deleting or delisting one’s personal content can be
viewed as an act in furtherance of data protection, but given that
there remains the possibility that social media platforms could
incur dereferencing obligations under the right to be forgotten,
a broad right to remove other individual’s post that contains a
requesting data subject’s information on social media can cause
a reduction in the availability of information to people around
the world.139 The most serious result could be the silencing of
cries for democracy and freedom from oppression.140
The Arab Spring—a period of time in which the Middle East
saw rapid governmental and social change—is illustrative of the
role that social media and the internet as a whole has in relation
to the free flow of, and access to, information.141 Facebook

See generally Larson, supra note 84, at 107 (discussing the exception
to the GDPR).
136 Id. at 108.
137 Id.
138 See Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 389 (noting that the right to
delete one’s own social media posts is increasingly provided by social media
platforms as a sufficient means of data protection).
139 Id. at 365; see also Dowdell, supra note 129, at 324 (identifying that
delisting information could have the same effect as deleting the information
altogether).
140 See Keller, supra note 111, at 364 (stating that under the right to be
forgotten “[b]loggers documenting misuse of power can be silenced”).
141 Rebecca J. Rosen, So, Was Facebook Responsible for the Arab Spring
After
All?,
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
3,
2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/09/so-was-facebookresponsible-for-the-arab-spring-after-all/244314/
(noting
that
“[e]ven
though . . . other tools played their parts, Facebook was on a plane of its own.”).
135
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specifically became a platform for participants to share their
experiences which were then spread across the world.142 The
Arab Spring began in 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi’s produce
stand was seized by the Tunisian government after he refused
to pay officials bribes.143 Bouazizi then poured paint thinner on
his body and set himself on fire, protesting the harsh Tunisian
regime.144 In Egypt, a short time earlier, the killing of Khaled
Said went viral across social media platforms, after police had
beat him to death over evidence he had obtained of police
corruption.145 These events sparked many other protests, which
were then filmed or photographed and shared all over social
media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.146
Individuals across the Middle East viewed common experiences
on social media, increasing the awareness of the harsh realities
of oppressive governments.147 One eyewitness stated, “[w]e were
online every day . . . and on the streets pretty much every day,
collecting information, collecting videos, organizing protests,
[and] getting into protests[,]” calling Facebook “the GPS for this
revolution.”148 Protests spread to Egypt, Libya, and Syria,
causing these governments to try to censor the protests on social
media by cutting off internet access to their citizens.149 Although
these protests were not as successful in ending oppressive
regimes, they did end in the overthrow of Muammar Al Qaddafi
in Libya150 an improvement for human rights in Tunisia.151
Id.
Robin Wright, Assessing the Arab Spring Uprisings After Four Years,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
17,
2014,
9:25
AM),
https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/12/17/assessing-the-arab-springuprisings-after-four-years/.
144 Id.
145 Jennifer Preston, Movement Began With Outrage and a Facebook Page
That
Gave
It
an
Outlet,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
5,
2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/middleeast/06face.html.
146 Rosen, supra note 141.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149
David Wolman, Facebook, Twitter Help the Arab Spring Blossom,
WIRED (Apr. 16, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/04/arabspring/.
150
AFP, Libya in chaos since 2011 overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi,
TIMESLIVE
(Nov.
10,
2018,
9:51
AM),
https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-11-10-libya-in-chaos-since-2011overthrow-of-muammar-gaddafi/.
151 See generally The Arab Spring: A Year of Revolution, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Dec. 17, 2011, 6:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab142
143
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Social media facilitated the spread of information, albeit
eyewitness accounts, and played “a vital role in the Arab
Spring[‘s]” existence.152
Should hosts be required to comport with the right to be
forgotten, the removal or delisting of information on social media
platforms could prevent events like the Arab Spring from
happening in the future either in the EU or abroad. The posts
by protestors on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube regarding the
Arab Spring could have been removed or delisted had a social
media post contained information regarding an EU citizen under
the current scheme enacted by the GDPR and the recent decision
in Google v. CNIL.153 Paragraph 72 of that decision left open the
possibility that the right to be forgotten could apply globally, if
after a consideration of free expression and privacy effects, such
global application was necessary to fulfill the legislative
objective of data protection and privacy.154 Thereafter, an EU
citizen would need only show that the post or information
concerning them was “inadequate, irrelevant or excessive in
relation to the purposes of the processing . . . .155 In effect, the
right to be forgotten could “rewrite history,” altering the ability
of free information to flow from one individual to the next by
allowing an individual to remove even the most trivial of
information from the internet.156
The importance of the free exchange of ideas and
information is grounded in the theories of self-fulfillment and
marketplace of ideas—that individuals are in a better position
to understand what is best for them when they have unlimited

spring-a-year-of-revolution (describing the events of the Arab Spring).
152 Ira Steven Nathenson, Super-Intermediaries, Code, Human Rights, 8
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 19, 23 (2013).
153 Keller, supra note 111, at 325–26.
154 Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Comm’n Nationale de I’Informatique et
des Libertés (CNIL), 2019 CURIA (Sept. 24, 2019).
155 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEDP), 2014 CURIA (May 13, 2014); see also Case C-18/18, Eva
Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited, 2019 CURIA (Oct. 3, 2019)
(holding that a defamatory Facebook post concerning an Austrian citizen was
required to be removed by the social media platform in Ireland).
156 See Larson, supra note 84, at 119 (discussing how the creation of a
right that would allow a person to prohibit speech about himself would be at
odds with the general functions of free speech).
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access to information to aid in formulating opinions and ideas.157
One fundamental principle of the self-fulfillment theory states
that “the purpose of society . . . is to promote the welfare of the
individual . . . [and] that every individual is entitled to equal
opportunity to share in decisions which affect him.”158 “[T]he
marketplace of ideas theory holds that unencumbered free
speech is a public good because it enables members of society to
evaluate and compare their ideas, beliefs, and assumptions.”159
Under this theory, democratic participation is also achieved, as
those engaged in the uprisings in the Arab Spring had utilized
information on social media to form the basis of their
movements.160
Thus, in removing or delisting information from the
internet, individuals are denied the full ability to better their
minds and standing in the world, the opposite of which occurred
during the Arab Spring.161 Protestors collected information on
social media concerning protests in other areas, which allowed
them to formulate a plan and organize the protests.162
Therefore, it is axiomatic that providing a means of removing or
delisting such information to EU citizens can hinder such events
from occurring in the EU. However, this risk could be
exacerbated under Google v. CNIL as data can be required to be
removed in another country.163
Consider two hypothetical situations which could result in
the hindrance of free access to information in the aftermath of
Google v. CNIL. Joe, an EU citizen, requested that a news
article164 regarding a protest against the Tunisian government
Id. at 110, 112–13.
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 880 (1963).
159 Larson, supra note 84, at 112.
160
See Keller, supra note 111, at 364 (noting that a balance between
privacy and information rights “is necessary to support both individual and
collective rights to liberty and democratic participation.”).
161 Larson, supra note 84, at 120.
162 Wolman, supra note 149; see also Keller, supra note 111 at 364 (stating
that under the GDPR and the right to be forgotten, “[b]loggers documenting
misuse of power can be silenced”).
163 See Finck, supra note 32 (highlighting the incompatibility between
data laws in different countries).
164
See e.g., Mitchell, supra note 82 (noting that although there is an
157
158
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that he had participated in years ago be delisted or dereferenced
from its listing on Facebook. The article can also be found in
Tunisia and Joe has met the requirements to have the
information dereferenced. The news outlet then removes the
article and the information therein is now so less accessible that
it is essentially rendered deleted.165 Consider a simpler
situation in which a citizen of Country X, a member state of the
EU, participates in a protest and posts criticisms of past actions
of the current leader on Facebook. The leader, also a citizen of
Country X, requests that the post or data be removed from
Facebook.166
If Facebook removes or delists said post,
information in the user’s post is withdrawn from the market and
the experiences shared therein become irrelevant.
Both
hypotheticals illustrate how the availability of information to
individuals can be limited by the right to be forgotten, a
situation which stands in direct contradiction to two theories of
free expression: the self-fulfillment theory and the marketplace
of ideas theory.167 This danger has intensified in the aftermath
of Google v. CNIL, as the reduction of information from the
market can take place on a global level.168
B. Free Speech by a Free Press: A Chilling Effect
American news programs, such as the Washington Post,
have reported on various privacy concerns including instances
in which conversations that are recorded by Amazon’s Alexa
have potentially been used to aid prosecutors in a murder
investigation in the U.S.169 These news programs have also
exception to the right to be forgotten for public information and free expression
news articles about individuals have still been removed from the internet).
165 Keller, supra note 111, at 324–25.
166
See generally Case C-18/18, Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook
Ireland Limited, 2019 CURIA (Oct. 3, 2019) (illustrating a similar situation in
which Facebook Ireland was ordered to remove a defamatory post. The CJEU
relied on a separate provision of the GDPR, but a similar fact pattern is not
unthinkable to occur within the confines of the right to be forgotten).
167 See generally Emerson, supra note 158 (discussing the theories of a
“free market place of ideas” and self-fulfillment as a result of self-expression).
168 Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Comm’n Nationale de I’Informatique et
des Libertés (CNIL), 2019 CURIA (Sept. 24, 2019) (discussing the need for
balancing the rights to privacy and information in deciding orders of “dereferencing”).
169
Meagan Flynn, Police think Alexa may have witnessed a New
Hampshire double slaying homicide. Now they want Amazon to turn her over.,
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reported on the 2018 Facebook data breach that left the personal
information of 29 million people worldwide in the hands of
computer hackers.170 These ongoing reports issued by various
media outlets on growing privacy have become commonplace.
Yet, in an ironic turn, one of the major effects of the enforcement
of the right to be forgotten has been the censoring of news outlets
on a global level who report information about individuals, and
therefore can become subject to dereferencing obligations.171
Protecting the freedom of the press was intended to be a
mainstay of the GDPR, including enacting exceptions172 for
public information that is “necessary for reasons of substantial
public interest . . . .”173 However, news articles have been
removed about individuals and media outlets in Europe have
experienced removal of their content online. It is important to
note that public court documents are not immune from the reach
of the right to be forgotten.174
The general consensus for critics against the right to be
forgotten is that acts of dereferencing conflicts with free speech
by censoring news outlets and free press and thus hinders the
ability of media outlets to provide information to individuals.175
This criticism is not to specifically categorize the idea of a free
WASH.
POST,
(Nov.
14,
2018,
7:28
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/14/police-think-alexa-mayhave-witnessed-new-hampshire-double-slaying-now-they-want-amazon-turnher-over/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.70ca5d976bb9.
170
Munsif Vengattil & Paresh Dave, Facebook now says data breach
affected 29 million users, details impact, REUTERS, (Oct. 12, 2018, 12:52 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-cyber/facebook-says-attackersstole-details-from-29-million-users-idUSKCN1MM297.
171 Michael J. Oghia, Information Not Found: The “Right to Be Forgotten”
as an Emerging Threat to Media Freedom in the Digital Age, CTR. INT’L MEDIA
ASSISTANCE (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.cima.ned.org/publication/right-to-beforgotten-threat-press-freedom-digital-age/.
172 See 2016 O.J. (L 119/2) 2016/679 (detailing exceptions from the right
to erasure).
173 Id. art. 9(2)(g).
174 Oghia, supra, note 171; Jeff Cox, Inside the Implications of GDPR &
CCPA on Public Records, LEGALTECH NEWS (Feb. 15, 2019, 12:00 PM),
https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2019/02/15/inside-the-implications-ofgdpr-ccpa-on-public-records/.
175 See generally Edward Lee, The Right to Be Forgotten v. Free Speech,
12 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 85, 98 (2015) (noting that there is great concern
over the effects that the right to be forgotten had impacted free speech and
censorship).
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press as inferior to the press’ free speech rights, but to illustrate
the interplay of those freedoms that contribute to the larger
umbrella of free expression.176 Critics that support greater free
speech rights maintain that by providing means to remove
information from the internet, individuals censor organizations
and other individuals that expressed that information.177 Critics
that support greater free press rights argue that media outlets’
ability to report news is severely hindered when articles and
similar postings can be removed from the internet.178 It is the
free speech rights of a press that facilitates the ability of media
outlets to practice their function as a free press by providing
information to the masses, and removing that right creates a
major concern for media outlets around the world.179
In the face of a threat to free access of information through
media outlets and internet sources, the CJEA took action.180 The
CJEU held in Google Spain that the right to be forgotten is not
absolute, which was solidified in the public information
exception of the GDPR; however, it intended the ruling to be
more narrowly drawn in consideration of other rights they
considered to be fundamental to garner attention.181 In doing so,
the court recognized that the right to be forgotten places a great
deal of power in the hands of data subjects and controllers alike
by allowing individuals to remove information that may be
considered to be in the public domain.182 The motivation for such
an exception may be compelling and in line with the original
aspirations of the 1950 Convention.183 The Convention’s goals
Id.
Statement on The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press at ¶
4, Case C-507/17, Google, LLC. v. Comm’n nationale de l’informatique et des
libertés (CNIL), https://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/2017-11-29-Googe-vCNIL.pdf [hereinafter RCFP Statement].
178 Oghia, supra, note 171.
179
See RCFP Statement, supra note 177 (discussing how free speech
rights in the context of free press is worrisome).
180 See generally Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos (AEDP), 2014 CURIA (May 13, 2014) (discussing how the
court balanced individual interests and public interests).
181 Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. 88, 90–92
(2012).
182 See Cox, supra note 174 (discussing the Bujaldon case in an effort to
exemplify removal of information from the public domain).
183 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 9, opened for signature
176
177
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were to protect privacy interests as well as solidify other
fundamental rights such as the freedom of speech and
expression. While enforcing a right to be forgotten can further
these goals, it can be seen as favoring the right to privacy as
opposed to free expression as more significant in allowing public
information to be removed as it currently is.184 This is due to the
fact that the free expression exception is left to the
interpretation and guidance of the member states, which can be
imprecise and may conflict with other nations’ valuation of both
free speech and free press.185 Allowing for member states to
consider free expression on a case by case basis creates a chilling
effect on the same.186
A true free press allows for the widespread flow of
information to individuals.187 The United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (hereinafter “UNESCO”)
stated, “Freedom of Information and Freedom of Expression
work against the concentration of information within the hands
of a few. Of course, all information is subject to interpretation.
For this reason, the clearinghouse function of an open and
pluralistic media sector is critical to a better understanding of
any issue”.188
However, in the enforcement of the right to be forgotten,
newspapers, magazines, and a broad variety of information
sources are forced to delist information from public access.189 At
Nov. 4th, 1950, ETS No. 005 [hereinafter ECHR].
184 See Rosen, supra note 181 (discussing how more weight given to the
right to privacy might adversely affect the importance of freedom of
expression).
185 Larson, supra note 84, at 107.
186 See id. at 107–08 (interpreting the statement, “allowing each Member
State to create its own definitions grants a heckler’s veto to the state with the
most limited speech protections, and forces Web sites and Internet users into
a morass of inconsistent international law.”).
187 See id. at 106 (quoting “the terms ‘freedom of expression,’ ‘journalistic
purposes,’ and ‘artistic or literary expression’ are not defined, item 121 of the
recitals”).
188
Access
to
Information,
UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/events/prizes-andcelebrations/celebrations/international-days/world-press-freedomday/previous-celebrations/worldpressfreedomday2009001/themes/access-toinformation/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) [hereinafter UNESCO].
189 See generally The Directive, supra note 9 (interpreting the Right of
Access Section under Article 12).
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the very center of Google Spain was the request for the removal
of information regarding González in various newspaper
articles.190 The right to be forgotten leaves any source that
publishes an EU citizen’s information on the internet vulnerable
to be ordered to delist that information. This creates a broad
application of a right which has been deemed a “foundation of
justice and peace in the world”.191 Therefore, it is difficult to
sever the relationship that the enforcement and promulgation of
the right to be forgotten has with free speech and free press. The
newspaper that published the information containing
González’s likeness was exercising the same freedom that would
be afforded to any other individual that speaks of another person
in conversation. This is the precis argument of news outlets and
the RCFP that contend that the right restricts media outlet’s
efficacy and ability to reach their audiences because it
materially weakens free speech.192
The RCFP is a U.S. based organization with a mission “to
keep government accountable by ensuring access to public
records, meetings and courtrooms; and to preserve the principles
of free speech . . . .”193 On behalf of organizations such as Dow
Jones & Company; Hearst Corporation; The New York Times;
and Thomson Reuters Markets, LLC, the RCFP filed the
equivalent of an amicus brief with the European Court of Justice
in the proceedings for Google v. CNIL.194 This brief offers points
of contention to the right to be forgotten and its implications
concerning free speech.
The specific argument of the organization is twofold; first,
delisting on a search engine limits the effectiveness of the press
worldwide; and second, different countries compare the
importance of the right to be forgotten and the right of free
speech in various ways.195 The implication of the first point is
190 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEDP), 2014 CURIA (May 13, 2014).
191 ECHR, supra note 183, at 5.
192 RCFP Statement, supra note 177, ¶ 20.
193 Mission, Reporters Committee for Freedom of The Press (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://www.rcfp.org/about/mission/
[http://web.archive.org/web/20170803020417/https://www.rcfp.org/about/missi
on].
194 RCFP Statement, supra note 177, at 1.
195 Id. ¶¶ 6–7
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that by allowing any public information to be removed from the
internet around the world, including news articles, hinders the
reach of media outlets.196 The RCFP states, “any single state’s
attempt to limit worldwide access to public information
represents an existential threat to journalistic freedom and the
fundamental rights of the people to receive information through
any media . . . .”197
The second point emphasizes the fact that countries across
the world have differing customs, and thus the enforcement of
the right to be forgotten is not promulgated “in a vacuum.”198
For example: it is a crime in Germany to deny the Holocaust;
this restriction would not receive much opposition, but would
most likely be incompatible with American free speech
ideology.199 Furthermore, the U.S. ranks first among nations for
free speech tolerance on the Free Expression Index at 5.73, as
collected by the World Economic Forum.200 Other nations are
ranked variably, including Germany at 18th overall, with a score
of 4.34, and Japan at 30th overall, with a score of 3.27.201 In the
midst of these differing viewpoints, the GDPR requires strict
compliance and makes all other applicable laws subordinate,
censoring the media outlets in countries that otherwise provide
greater protection.202 Therefore, allowing the right to be
forgotten to extend outside the EU would facilitate censorship of
media outlets and restrict free access to information. While free
press and free speech receive different treatment worldwide,
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 4.
198
See id. ¶¶ 15–16, 31–32 (discussing how different countries have
different ways of balancing the right of freedom of expression, on the one hand,
and the right to privacy on the other).
199 Yascha Mounk, Verboten: Germany’s risky law for stopping hate speech
on
Facebook
and
Twitter,
NEW
REPUBLIC
(Apr.
3,
2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/147364/verboten-germany-law-stopping-hatespeech-facebook-twitter.
200 Alex Gray, Freedom of speech: which country has the most?, WORLD
ECON.
FORUM
(Nov.
8,
2016),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/11/freedom-of-speech-countrycomparison/ (compiling the Index on a score from zero to eight, with zero being
the least tolerant of free speech and eight being the most supportive).
201 Id.
202 See GDPR, supra note 10, art. 115 (discussing how laws adopted by
third countries that purport to regulate citizens of Member States must be in
compliance with the GDPR).
196
197
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censoring media outlets hinders the spread of information,
which if anything, provides an outlet for oppressed individuals.
As UNESCO so aptly states, “[i]nformation is power. Freedom
of Information and Freedom of Expression work against the
concentration of information within the hands of a few.”203
C. Super-Intermediaries: A Road Block for Free Information
As the use of social media surges, so do requests to delist
information and disputes over data usage.204 In most situations,
users of these sites publish information on their accounts, and
when they want to remove that information, the company or
data controller turns toward its own internal protocols to
adjudicate the request.205 Although the CJEU has yet to issue a
definitive ruling as to whether the right to be forgotten applies
to social media platforms as hosts, it is important to consider the
impact of potentially placing such obligations on them, as Google
and other data controllers currently have.206 The GDPR
reinforced this responsibility on the part of data controllers,
tasking them with the immediate effectuation of the right to be
forgotten. For example, in Google Spain Google was ordered to
remove Mr. González’s information.207
Data controllers like Google are tasked with responding to
requests for removal due to a variety of circumstances including
harassment, hateful speech, and more.208
Thus, these
companies become intermediaries—acting as adjudicator of
disputes between data subjects and data controllers.209 Being
that these intermediaries are controlling the influx of data on
their site, they are implicitly tasked with adjudicating disputes
UNESCO, supra note 188.
See Casey Newton, Facebook is making an all-out push for
regulation—on its own terms, VERGE (Apr. 2, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/4/2/18291413/facebook-regulationmark-zuckerberg-european-tour (illustrating that Facebook faces constant
pressure regarding their use of personal data).
205 Id.
206 See Keller, supra note 111, at 324–26 (discussing the potential impact
of placing rule to be forgotten obligation on social media platforms).
207 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEDP), 2014 CURIA (May 13, 2014).
208 Nathenson, supra note 152 at 122.
209 Id. at 22–23.
203
204
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concerning individual rights and privacy interests.210 The rise
of such entities as YouTube, Google, and Facebook have given
way to a theory of “super-intermediaries,” promulgated by Ira
Steven Natheson, which dictates that certain intermediaries
have a high degree of involvement, legal scrutiny, and
reputation, which creates immense power when adjudicating
these disputes.211 The GDPR and the extension of the right to
be forgotten across the world reaffirms the dangers of superintermediaries and further endangers free expression.212
The power of the super-intermediaries to adjudicate data
disputes can be a threat to the protection of privacy interests and
other human rights concerns, as the super-intermediaries
effectually stand in the shoes of courts.213 This is potentially
dangerous as these companies lack checks for accuracy and
transparency, as a court is usually required to comply with.214
The super-intermediaries determine if a request is worthy of
removal and the terms of use of that company usually dictate
the guidelines for such, which the entity itself creates.215 As
Rebecca MacKinnon notes, super-intermediaries’ regulation
employees “play the roles of lawmakers, judge, jury, and police
all at the same time.”216 Essentially, the companies become selfregulating and use their own discretion subject to abuse; unlike
courts which are subject to case precedent and state
210

power).
211

have).

See id. at 24–25 (discussing the nature of internet intermediaries’
See id. at 58–60 (discussing the amount of power super-intermediaries

See Adam Satariano, ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Privacy Rule Is Limited
by
Europe’s
Top
Court,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
24,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/technology/europe-google-right-to-beforgotten.html (discussing how opponents of the ruling said removing links
would set a dangerous precedent and make it easier for information to be
deleted from the internet).
213 See Nathenson, supra note 152, at 156 (discussing the importance that
super-intermediaries’ must strive for accuracy, i.e. the finding of facts, the
articulation of legal principles, and the application of facts to those principles,
in order to respect digital due process).
214
See id. (noting Facebook’s governance system not being enforced
consistently or uniformly).
215
See id. at 156–60 (discussing the lack of transparency superintermediaries demonstrate when deciding which requests are worthy of
removal).
216 See id. at 156.
212
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regulation.217 It should be noted that like a court, superintermediaries are subject to review via a lawsuit to enforce the
right to be forgotten, but the cost of bringing such a suit against
an organization with mass wealth and power can be difficult.218
Initial disputes however become adjudicated solely in the
hands of an employee, who will make the determination of
whether data is removed, implicitly determining privacy
interests on a daily basis.219 If discretion is abused, it is possible
that these entities can fall short of a court of law in the
effectuation of the right to be forgotten. Furthermore, superintermediaries’ transparency is completely self-regulated. The
degree of transparency of disputes and company policy
regarding data usage is in the companies’ discretion, casting
doubt on the integrity of the actual policies.220 As Nathenson
notes, a high degree of transparency should be assured, as it
provides confidence in the competency of companies to protect
privacy interests.221
Adequate protection of free expression can be hindered if the
right to be forgotten’s global reach continues.
Different
countries have different standards of free expression, and as
such, the right to be forgotten can require super-intermediaries
to be in violation of a country’s local law where data would
otherwise not be removed, or vice-versa.222 This can create
inconsistencies in the effectuation of privacy in a country that is
extremely friendly to free expression. Nathenson provides a
clear example with the “Innocence of Muslims” video that was
posted to YouTube in 2012,223 and was not removed from the site
217 See id. at 156–57 (discussing the additional layers of internal review
required by the intermediaries).
218
See id. (discussing how lawsuits regarding the removal of certain
speech, such as defamation of religion, present a much harder removal case).
219 See Nathenson, supra note 152, at 118–19 (discussing how extra-legal
techniques to regulate are often used such as internal self-guided regulation
where employees monitor systems for wrongful conduct).
220 Id. at 158.
221 See id. at 157–60 (describing the importance of transparency when
determining whether to grant a request for removal of speech/information).
222
See RCFP Statement, supra note 176, ¶¶ 4, 16–17 (discussing the
ability of individual states to establish their own values of free expression).
223
DerJungeMiroslav, Sam Bacile-The Innocence of Muslims Trailer,
YOUTUBE
(May
19,
2015),
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in the U.S. despite requests to do so.224 The video condemned
Islam and mocked the prophet Muhammad, creating a great
deal of controversy.225 However, YouTube refused to remove the
video from their site, due to the video’s compliance with YouTube
“hate speech policies.”226 Notwithstanding such compliance, the
protections of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
regarding hate speech would have allowed the video to remain
on the site upon a lawsuit.227 Thus, in this particular situation,
a hateful video was allowed to remain on the internet where
other countries, such as Egypt, had temporarily banned the
video.228
While it can be argued that the freedom of expression
prevailed in this scenario, inconsistencies remain—the video
was removed in Egypt, but was not removed in the U.S.229 The
global reach of the right to be forgotten will exacerbate these
inconsistencies and the power of super-intermediaries, such as
YouTube, to adjudicate these disputes. The danger that lies
within the allowance of social media companies to determine
privacy interests is real, and with the uncertainty of the global
reach deriving from Google v. CNIL, the number of disputes that
these companies will determine will only increase.
IV. IDEOLOGICAL IMPERIALISM
A. Data Imperialism
A potential implication of the right to be forgotten is the
assertion of EU jurisdiction onto other countries if the CJEU
rules in favor of the CNIL in Google v. CNIL.230 This is the
concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which Dan Svantesson
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YJBWCLeOEaM&bpctr=1554434143.
224 Nathenson, supra note 152, at 28–29, 78–79.
225 Id. at 29.
226 See id. at 79 (stating that the video did not violate YouTube’s terms of
service relating to hate speech).
227 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (listing the First Amendment rights to free
speech, religion and expression); see also Nathenson, supra note 152, at 31
(discussing how such speech would likely be protected by the First
Amendment).
228 Nathenson, supra note 152, at 79.
229 Id. at 28–29, 78–79.
230 Ryngaert, supra note 98, at 223–24.
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defines an act of such as “seek[ing] to control or otherwise
directly affect the activities of an object (person, business, etc.)
outside the territory of the state making the assertion.”231 Since
the introduction of the Directive in 1995, the EU has become
infamous for asserting its own privacy laws extraterritorially to
protect its subjects in other sovereigns, in an effort to account
for the wide reach of the internet.232
The EU’s concerns have been that data controllers interact
with EU citizens in other countries, which leaves such
individuals subject to the data protection laws of that locale.233
Under Article 3(2)(a) of the GDPR for example, social media sites
that store information of “subjects residing in the [EU]” must be
compliant with the right to be forgotten and the respective
regulations under the GDPR.234 As Svantesson notes, “an EU
resident providing personal information during a holiday in New
York would be protected by the EU data protection Regulation
by virtue of his EU residence.”235
An act of such extraterritorial jurisdiction can be analogized
to an imperialistic campaign by the EU in the name of data
privacy.236 According to Merriam-Webster, imperialism is the
“extension or imposition of power,” the imposition of which has
historically caused wars, famine, and a loss of freedom.237
Imperialistic campaigns often leave the passive nation with a
loss of sovereign autonomy, with the aggressive nation asserting
its own jurisdiction over that passive nation.238 In a modern
231 Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy
Law—Its Theoretical Justification and Its Practical Effect on U.S. Businesses,
50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 60 (2014).
232 Id. at 62–63.
233 Id. at 71.
234 GDPR, supra note 10, art. 3(2)(a).
235 Svantesson, supra note 231, at 71.
236 Id. at 94; see also Warren Pengilley, United States Trade and Antitrust
Laws: A Study of International Legal Imperialism from Sherman to Helms
Burton, 6 COMPETITION & CONSUMER L. J. 187, 212–13 (1998).
237
Imperialism,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/imperialism (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (explaining the
broad definition of imperialism).
238
James Thuo Gathii, Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism, and
International Law, 67 ALA. L. REV. 335, 364 (2003) [hereinafter Gathii I]; see
generally James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism, Colonialism, and International
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context, imperialism has been used to identify the acts of the
U.S. in other countries to promote its own domestic interests,
such as extending extraterritorial jurisdiction over commercial
activity without American borders.239 This type of imperialism
stands in direct conflict with the theory of sovereignty, a
principle of international law which dictates that nations have
ultimate authority to govern those within their borders.240
The specific imposition of power to solidify data privacy has
been named “data imperialism”241 which can cause two major
negative effects. First, a potential conflict of law between the
two nations may arise, undermining the integrity of the host
nation by violating sovereignty and poor diplomatic relations.242
Second, in asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction, the EU
imparts the same restrictions on free expression under the right
to be forgotten onto citizens of other nations.243
One important example of such data imperialism is
demonstrated by the issuance of fines to data controllers who fail
to comport with the right to be forgotten.244 When a fine is
issued, there is a great chance that in order to minimize any
financial implications, the data controller will cede to the EU’s
regulations, thereby rendering any other nation’s regulations to
the contrary moot.245 While this implication is not as easily
identifiable, in essence, it is the equivalent of coercive and
forcible compliance with EU law.246
Furthermore, as the right to be forgotten is given validity to
Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1013 (2007) (discussing imperialism and its effect on
jurisdiction between nations) [hereinafter Gathii II].
239 Gathii II, supra note 238, at 1063.
240
See generally Arthur Lenhoff, International Law and Rules on
International Jurisdiction, 50 CORNELL L. REV. 5 (1964) (discussing the conflict
between imperialism and sovereignty).
241 Ryngaert, supra note 98, at 224.
242 Id. at 223.
243 Id.
244 Satariano, supra note 50.
245 See id. (discussing how the right to be forgotten has difficulties being
enforced beyond the European Union); see also Keller, supra note 111, at 350
(discussing how privacy and information rights are enforced under European
Union law).
246 Satariano, supra note 50.
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be asserted in other nations pursuant to Google v. CNIL, the EU
has successfully launched an imperialistic campaign asserting
its own ideologies on other nations as an act that will worsen
diplomatic relations abroad and weaken freedom of expression
across the world.247
B. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Conflict of Laws
CNIL’s argument in Google Spain was that the only method
to adequately enforce the right to be forgotten was to allow its
application in other countries where data is found and requested
to be deleted by EU citizens;248 by doing so, it exerts the EU’s
ideology of the paramount importance of protecting subjects
from exploitation on the internet.249 While it cannot be said that
this ideology is necessarily based on anything but consideration
for human rights, the application of such limits free expression
and a free press as stated above.250 Additionally, other countries
may not have anything akin to the right to be forgotten, or they
might apply a similar right in different manners, such as giving
more deference to the companies that process data.251 Thus, the
effect of extraterritorial jurisdiction as conflicting with laws of
other nations can create an unreasonable interference with the
law of that nation that only benefits the nation which is seeking
to impose its law on others.252
A paradigm of the conflicting viewpoints is the American
view of privacy in relation to free speech and free press. Under
the First Amendment, free speech and free press are enshrined
247 Bill Chappell, ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ Only Applies to Websites Inside
EU, European Court Says, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 24, 2019, 2:11 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/09/24/763857307/right-to-be-forgotten-only-appliesinside-eu-european-court-says.
248 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEDP), 2014 CURIA (May 13, 2014).
249 Finck, supra note 32.
250
See generally supra Part II (discussing the ideology of restricting
freedom by forgetting).
251 See generally Ryngaert, supra note 98, at 224 (noting that conflicts can
occur with nations whom have other “regulatory views or stronger connection
with the data controller”).
252 Brendan Van Alsenoy & Marieke Koekkoek, Internet and Jurisdiction
after Google Spain: The Extra-Territorial Reach of the EU’s Right to be
Forgotten 24 (Leuven Ctr. for Glob. Governance Studs., Working Paper No.
152, 2015).
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in the U.S. Constitution.253 While U.S. law recognizes privacy
interests in so-called private information that has not yet been
made public, it also protects information that has been made
public while the right to be forgotten, in application, does not.254
Public information is protected under the First Amendment, as
free access to information was a major motivation of the drafters
of the U.S. Constitution.255 As Professor Dawinder Sidhu
observed in a 2014 U.S. News and World Report article:
[t]he vision of a marketplace of ideas illustrates why [American]
society places a premium on free speech. As part of our DNA, we
believe that, in the marketplace of ideas, the value or truth of
information will spring forth from the open consideration of
competing opinions, viewpoints, and perspectives. The availability
and discussion of that information, when relevant to policy and
policymakers, can enrich and enhance our capacity for selfgovernance.256

Such is the justification for the fact that publication of
criminal history is disallowed in America, which is contrasted
with the ruling in Google Spain, in which González was granted
the ability to remove information regarding a bankruptcy
proceeding.257 Thus, privacy law in America is seen to have
significant weighing checks, such as free speech and free access
to information, which conflicts with the promulgation of EU
privacy law.
America is not alone. The newly instituted GDPR recognizes
and accounts for the many differing views on free speech and
privacy from various countries.258 The new GDPR requires the
assurance of data protection in transfers made to countries that
U.S. CONST. amend I.
Dowdell, supra note 129, at 334.
255 Dawinder Sidhu, Privacy Doesn’t Exist in a Vacuum, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Dec. 8, 2014, 12:45 PM), https://www.usnews.com/debateclub/should-there-be-a-right-to-be-forgotten-on-the-internet/privacy-doesntexist-in-a-vaccum.
256 Id.
257 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEPD), 2014 CURIA (May 13, 2014).
258 See GDPR, supra note 10, art. 6 (providing the regulation on data
processing protections).
253
254
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are not ratified for their privacy laws by the EU.259 The
regulation in the GDPR only applies to transfers made within
the EU,260 which is an example of a privacy regulation that
adequately ensures data privacy without acting in an
extraterritorial manner. However, the EU nonetheless asserts
extraterritorial jurisdiction over American citizens or other
nations when the GDPR directly conflicts with the law and
ideology of that nation and the provisions of same are required
to be enforced.261 This point is not made to ratify the conduct of
a country who has little to no privacy regulation, but rather to
illustrate that countries regulate privacy laws differently in
relation to other fundamental rights. In such a situation,
international conflicts can emanate from jurisdictional
concerns.262
With different countries asserting jurisdiction in foreign
territories, antitrust law has become an area of law generating
great conflict.263 Conflicts in this area derive from the contacts
that certain commercial entities have within a particular
country.264 Likewise, potential conflicts can emanate asserting
jurisdiction over an American company in America storing an
EU citizen’s data.265 Other conflicts such as trade disputes and
jurisdictional treaties are evidence of the potential presence of
territorial conflicts in the area of data privacy enforcement.266

259
See Gray, supra note 200 (providing statistics on how various
countries view freedom of speech); see also GDPR, supra note 10, art. 6
(providing the regulation on data processing protections).
260 See generally GDPR, supra note 10.
261
See generally Ryngaert, supra note 98, at 245 (discussing how
extraterritoriality can create conflicts for nations).
262 See Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction,
77 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L L. PROC. 370, 370 (1983) (discussing how jurisdictional
concerns can lead to international conflicts).
263
See id.at 372 (discussing how antitrust law has direct effects on
jurisdiction).
264 See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915 (2011) (discussing conflicts that occurred when an American court asserted
jurisdiction over a tire company for events that occurred in France).
265 See C-507/17, Google LLC v. Comm’n Nationale de I’Informatique et
des Libertés (CNIL), 2019 CURIA (Sept. 24, 2019) (discussing jurisdiction
regarding citizen’s data).
266 Finck, supra note 32.
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C. Data Imperialism’s Impacts on Freedoms Globally: An
Outlook
If the EU is vindicated in Google v. CNIL, the
extraterritorial jurisdictional provisions of the GDPR could
necessitate the introduction of an international treaty or
agreement which provides consensual jurisdiction in other
countries to avoid potential conflict. Regardless, a potential
effect of extending the reach of the right to be forgotten is the
limitation on free expression.267 By enforcing the right to be
forgotten abroad in other countries, the EU’s premium on the
right to remove information in furtherance of privacy interests
over free expression could have a chilling effect on free speech—
via removal of public information and monetary fines for
violations of the GDPR.268
V. CONCLUSION
There is much left unanswered in the wake of Google v.
CNIL as to the legal basis or existence of a global application of
the right to be forgotten.269 As it stands now, a global application
of the right to be forgotten will significantly limit free
expression, including free access to information, free speech and
free press.270 Such a dereliction of free expression can negatively
impact the spread of knowledge and betterment of the world.271
Furthermore, the right to be forgotten allows Google and other
data controllers to become adjudicators of free expression, which
threatens the integrity and protection of such right.272 In
allowing the right to be forgotten to exist as it does, or expand
such to exist beyond the territory of the EU, the EU is allowed
to engage in global data imperialism under the cloak of goodwill
and the common good.273 This imperialistic campaign can work
to worsen diplomatic relations and act as a vehicle to hinder free

Larson, supra note 84, at 107–08.
Dowdell, supra note 129, at 334.
269 See Case C-507/17, (Sept. 24, 2019) (discussing what was not discussed
in Google v. CNIL regarding the right to be forgotten).
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expression abroad.274 It is imperative, therefore, that the
negative effects of the right to be forgotten are not, in essence,
forgotten.

274
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